Super Bowl III, considered by many sports historians was not a fluke in my opinion. The New York Jets were 18 point underdogs, and yet they spanked the Colts 16-7, and it wasn't that close. New York led 16-0 and gave up a fourth quarter touchdown after Baltimore pulled quarterback Earl Morrall in favor of Johnny Unitas, who had been injured all year.
This was a case of a superior game plan defeating a team with superior athletes. The Colts never saw it coming, just as Goliath never thought about the need to defend against a 120 mile an hour stone until a split second before his death.
I've been interested in this literally for decades, but I really learned a lot from corresponding with sports historian and author Bob Lederer, who collected great information for his new book, Beyond Broadway Joe--The Super Bowl Team That Changed Football.
In Super Bowl III, the poor Colts defenders wondered why it was that quarterback Joe Namath always seemed to have the right play called to defeat their hitherto invincible Blitz. How could Joe know that the blitz was coming? Well, the answer is that Joe didn't know. Bob was able to confirm for me that the Jets knew how to change the play after the snap via the "hot read," and the Baltimore Colts did not. The Jets actually changed the play when the Blitz came, AFTER the snap. The "hot receiver" would shorten his route so that Namath could dump it off quickly. The Colts had no such play, meaning that they had to guess whether the Blitz was coming BEFORE the snap, and they were basically stuck running the play that was called. If it was the wrong play, they just had to live with the results. So no wonder Namath always had the answer for the Baltimore Blitz. He could adapt in the middle of the play, whereas Baltimore could not. They just couldn't figure it out.
This was a case of a superior game plan defeating a team with superior athletes. The Colts never saw it coming, just as Goliath never thought about the need to defend against a 120 mile an hour stone until a split second before his death.
I've been interested in this literally for decades, but I really learned a lot from corresponding with sports historian and author Bob Lederer, who collected great information for his new book, Beyond Broadway Joe--The Super Bowl Team That Changed Football.
In Super Bowl III, the poor Colts defenders wondered why it was that quarterback Joe Namath always seemed to have the right play called to defeat their hitherto invincible Blitz. How could Joe know that the blitz was coming? Well, the answer is that Joe didn't know. Bob was able to confirm for me that the Jets knew how to change the play after the snap via the "hot read," and the Baltimore Colts did not. The Jets actually changed the play when the Blitz came, AFTER the snap. The "hot receiver" would shorten his route so that Namath could dump it off quickly. The Colts had no such play, meaning that they had to guess whether the Blitz was coming BEFORE the snap, and they were basically stuck running the play that was called. If it was the wrong play, they just had to live with the results. So no wonder Namath always had the answer for the Baltimore Blitz. He could adapt in the middle of the play, whereas Baltimore could not. They just couldn't figure it out.
Bob Lederer confirmed that for me, after I had wondered about that for years. Try as I might, I couldn't find a reference on the internet explaining the origin of the "hot read." I once met Browns star running back Greg Pruitt at a Browns Backers affair at Tuty's in Beavercreek Ohio, and asked him that question. Greg came along a few years later (1973) and wasn't completely sure when the hot read came along, but did say that the Browns implemented a form of that for him. His job changed depending on who he was supposed to block. If it was a linebacker, it was his job to pass block. But if it was a defensive lineman, then he was to head out in the flat for a short pass.
Bob also reminded me that in 1968, many quarterbacks did not even have the option of creating an audible. The strategy varied from team to team, but play calls were sent in from the sideline when a substitute player would enter the game on every play; i.e., a "messenger guard" or "messenger tight end." They knew how to use the audible, but not all quarterbacks had permission under most circumstances.
On the other hand, Namath was allowed to call an audible at the line of scrimmage based on what he was seeing from the defense. If Joe wanted to change the play call, he could, and then if the blitz came, there was yet another change in the middle of the play. That was one of the strategic advantages that the Jets had.
Another huge advantage was the way that the quarterback dropped back to pass. Earl Morrall backpedaled with short steps, facing forward to see the entire field all the time. It was like dink dink dink dink dink dink dink clunk clunk bloop. Namath, on the other hand, turned sideways and glided back about 12 yards in his seven step drop and threw a noticeably faster ball. It was like swoosh swoosh swoosh kapow. Hence he had much more time to throw.
Namath's Jets won with ball control, dink and dunk offense that avoided turnovers and sacks. The Jets also had a sophisticated defense, using zone coverage and the "bump and run." These tactics were evolved in the AFL. The Colts were one of the first teams in the NFL to use the zone defense, but that was old hat for the Jets.
Defensive lineman Gerry Philbin made me laugh in some interviews many years later. Do you know the old adage that defensive linemen hate ALL quarterbacks, including the quarterback of their OWN team? Well, it's probably true. Gerry seemed to be really frustrated by Joe's tendency to be erratic at times. His viewpoint seemed to be that the defense was going to win the game as long as Namath didn't screw it up. Maybe he was right.
In that same vein, Curt Gowdy mentions during the Super Bowl III telecast that the Colts used to refer to star halfback Tom Matte (a converted quarterback) as the "Garbage Can." Gowdy explains that that Matte always gains a lot of yards "without really looking like it." But that's not it at all. That nickname was applied by defensive lineman Alex Karras, who scornfully implied that Matte padded his stats by getting supposedly easy yards in non-key situations, rather than the "tough yards." Matte, it must be understood, was handsome like a quarterback, dressed well and spoke well. That was enough to earn him the same type of flak normally reserved for the quarterback. Matte's teammates thought it was funny, and the nickname stuck.
But no matter. Although Joe Namath was unquestionably the most sensational star of the AFL that's not the only story. There's also the AFL tactics that gave them a major advantage. Then, just to prove it was no fluke, the Kansas City Chiefs beat up the Minnesota Vikings, the Purple People Eater team that was even better than Baltimore, so they said.
Bob also reminded me that in 1968, many quarterbacks did not even have the option of creating an audible. The strategy varied from team to team, but play calls were sent in from the sideline when a substitute player would enter the game on every play; i.e., a "messenger guard" or "messenger tight end." They knew how to use the audible, but not all quarterbacks had permission under most circumstances.
On the other hand, Namath was allowed to call an audible at the line of scrimmage based on what he was seeing from the defense. If Joe wanted to change the play call, he could, and then if the blitz came, there was yet another change in the middle of the play. That was one of the strategic advantages that the Jets had.
Another huge advantage was the way that the quarterback dropped back to pass. Earl Morrall backpedaled with short steps, facing forward to see the entire field all the time. It was like dink dink dink dink dink dink dink clunk clunk bloop. Namath, on the other hand, turned sideways and glided back about 12 yards in his seven step drop and threw a noticeably faster ball. It was like swoosh swoosh swoosh kapow. Hence he had much more time to throw.
Namath's Jets won with ball control, dink and dunk offense that avoided turnovers and sacks. The Jets also had a sophisticated defense, using zone coverage and the "bump and run." These tactics were evolved in the AFL. The Colts were one of the first teams in the NFL to use the zone defense, but that was old hat for the Jets.
Defensive lineman Gerry Philbin made me laugh in some interviews many years later. Do you know the old adage that defensive linemen hate ALL quarterbacks, including the quarterback of their OWN team? Well, it's probably true. Gerry seemed to be really frustrated by Joe's tendency to be erratic at times. His viewpoint seemed to be that the defense was going to win the game as long as Namath didn't screw it up. Maybe he was right.
In that same vein, Curt Gowdy mentions during the Super Bowl III telecast that the Colts used to refer to star halfback Tom Matte (a converted quarterback) as the "Garbage Can." Gowdy explains that that Matte always gains a lot of yards "without really looking like it." But that's not it at all. That nickname was applied by defensive lineman Alex Karras, who scornfully implied that Matte padded his stats by getting supposedly easy yards in non-key situations, rather than the "tough yards." Matte, it must be understood, was handsome like a quarterback, dressed well and spoke well. That was enough to earn him the same type of flak normally reserved for the quarterback. Matte's teammates thought it was funny, and the nickname stuck.
But no matter. Although Joe Namath was unquestionably the most sensational star of the AFL that's not the only story. There's also the AFL tactics that gave them a major advantage. Then, just to prove it was no fluke, the Kansas City Chiefs beat up the Minnesota Vikings, the Purple People Eater team that was even better than Baltimore, so they said.
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| Bob Lederer's book is not out yet, but I have already ordered mine from Amazon.com. |
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